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STATEMENT 0F THE CASE

I.

A. Nature 0f the Case

The Defendant-Appellant (“Defendant”), Jaree Heck, was convicted of
“Vicious dog at large”.

The Defendant disagrees with

“Vicious dog at large”

in fact, a

Code

§ 06.08.030.

actual crime.

is,

Phrased differently, the Defendant argues that “Vicious dog

in

Jerome City

at large” is

not an

that the State failed t0 provide sufﬁcient

at large” as

evidence t0 uphold a conviction for “Vicious dog
this case.

the magistrate court’s determination that

misdemeanor created by the language contained

However, the Defendant also argues

the crime of

deﬁned by

the jury instructions in

Accordingly, the magistrate erred in denying Defendant’s motions for judgment 0f

acquittal.

B.

The Course 0f Proceedings and the

Disposition

The Defendant was charged by uniform
dangerous dogs” pursuant

t0

Jerome City Code

voluntary guilty plea to that charge on

citation

with the misdemeanor 0f “Vicious and

§ 06.08.030.

November 20, 2018.

[R., p.8.]

[R., p.9.]

The Defendant entered a

However,

at the restitution

hearing held on January 11, 2019, the magistrate court appointed the public defender due t0 the

amount of restitution being sought.

[R., p.17, 21.]

through her newly appointed counsel,

moved

to

On February

14,

2019, the Defendant, by and

withdraw her guilty

Court granted the motion for withdrawal 0f guilty plea and entered a denial.

On April 26,

[R., p.25-29.]

plea.

The

[R., p.30.]

2019, the Defendant ﬁled a motion in limine, seeking t0 exclude photographs

and testimony regarding the alleged dog
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bite.

[R., p.66-67.]

At

the hearing

0n the Defendant’s

motion
State

in limine,

was going

it

became

t0

amend

clear that (1) Defendant’s counsel

was under

the impression that the

the charge t0 a simple “dog at large” under Jerome City

Code

§

06.08.020 and (2) that Defendant’s counsel disagreed that Jerome City Code § 06.08.030 actually
contained a crime called “Vicious dog at large”.

[Tr., p.4-5, 13.]

dog was running

State’s View, stating, “[T]he elements are that the

element ofthe deﬁnition ofvicious dog.”

The case proceeded

[Tr., p.19,

t0 a jury trial.

The magistrate court adopted the
at large

With the included

L.19 — p.21, L.4.]

The Defendant moved

for a

judgment of

acquittal

pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) after the State rested and again after the Defendant rested.
[Tr., p.75, 91.]

The magistrate court denied both Rule 29 motions.

then returned a verdict of guilty and the Defendant
this

time pursuant t0 I.C.R. 29(c)(2).

moved

[Tr., p.109.]

for a

[Tr.,

p.76-77, 91.]

The jury

judgment 0f acquittal, yet again,

The magistrate

court, again, denied the

Defendant’s Rule 29 motion.

The magistrate

court,

0n June

of conviction for Vicious dog

at large.

court.

[R.,

The

p.148—151.]

12,

2019, sentenced the Defendant and entered a judgment

[R., p.132.]

afﬁrmed the judgment of conviction.

district court

The Defendant then timely appealed

t0 the

The Defendant timely appealed

Idaho Supreme Court.

to the district

[R., p.209-19.]

[R., p.221-23.]

C. Statement of Facts

At

trial,

Defendant was,

the State called

at the

Laron Quintana as a witness.

time of the incident in this case, a

further testiﬁed that he

saw
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the Defendant’s

new

dog run from

its

Mr. Quintana testiﬁed

neighbor.

[Tr., p.46,

that the

L.16-17.]

He

yard, out 0f the gate t0 that yard, and

into

Mr. Quintana’s yard.

times on the hand.

[Tr., p.48,

L.5-24.] Mr. Quintana testiﬁed that the

The

[Tr., p.50, L. 12-14.]

1.

Was

2.

Did

Mr. Quintana’s hands.

t0

photographs 0f the dog in question were presented

[Tr.,

him multiple

Mr. Quintana’s
p.50-5 1.]

No

at trial.

0N APPEAL

ISSUES

II.

bit

State introduced photographs during

wounds

testimony, showing the extent 0f the

dog

the elements instruction incorrect?

the magistrate court err in denying the Defendant’s motions for judgment 0f acquittal

pursuant t0 I.C.R. 29(a) and I.C.R. 29(c)(2)?
3.

Is

there sufﬁcient evidence to sustain the verdict 0f guilty?

STANDARD 0F REVIEW

III.

Whether the jury has been properly
courts exercise free review.

When

See State

v.

instructed

is

whether the instructions as a Whole, and not

and accurately reﬂect applicable law. See State

942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993).

The

application and construction of statutes. State

(Ct.

a question 0f law over Which appellate

Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992).

reviewing jury instructions, the question

individually, fairly

is

v.

v.

Bowman, 124 Idaho

936,

appellate courts exercise free review over the

Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106

App. 2003).
In reviewing the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment 0f acquittal, the appellate court

must independently consider the evidence

in the record

and determine Whether a reasonable mind

could conclude that the defendant’s guilt as t0 such material evidence 0f the offense was proven
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beyond a reasonable doubt. State

v.

appellate court does not substitute

its

Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374,

View

for that

386 P.3d 895, 897 (2016). The

of the jury as to the credibility of the Witnesses,

the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences t0 be

evidence.

State

v.

Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001

(Ct.

drawn from the

App. 1991); State

v.

Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, the appellate court
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State

v.

Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); Knutson, 121 Idaho

Herrera-Brito, 131

at 104,

822 P.2d

at

1001.

The standard of review
upon a jury verdict

is

for sufﬁciency 0f the evidence for a judgment

Whether there was substantial evidence upon Which a reasonable

could have found the prosecution sustained

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State
State

v.

v.

its

its

View

for that

trier

0f fact

burden 0f proving the essential elements 0f the

Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004);

Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 172, 244 P.3d 1256, 1258

does not substitute

0f conviction entered

(Ct.

App. 2010). The appellate court

of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to

be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Lawyer,
150 Idaho

at 172,

244 P.3d

at

1258; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. Moreover, the

court considers the evidence in the light

172,

244 P.3d

1998).

at

1258; State

v.

most favorable

to the prosecution.

Lawyer, 150 Idaho

at

Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct .App.

If the court determines the evidence is insufﬁcient, the defendant is entitled to acquittal.

See Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho
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at 385,

957 P.2d

at

1101.

IV.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The Elements Instruction for the Crime 0f “Vicious

At the hearing 0n Defendant’s motion
.030

in limine, the

comply With a lawful written

is failure t0

order.”

Amended Proposed Jury Instructions, ﬁled 0n May
in writing t0 the Court’s interpretation

this objection t0 the

Defendant urges

this

Court

t0

Incorrect.

Defendant argued, “The only crime

[Tr., p.13, L.8-9.]

In the Defendant’s

2019, the Defendant speciﬁcally objected

[R., p.81.]

elements instruction.

Then, during the

[Tr., p.63, L.1-2.]

Defendant

trial,

Now, 0n

appeal, the

adopt Defendant’s interpretation 0f Jerome City Code § 6.08.030.

This Court exercises free review over the application and construction 0f statutes. State
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003).

is

plain and unambiguous, this Court

in statutory construction. State

v.

must give

rational

(Ct.

is

no occasion

Escobar, 134 Idaho
this

legislative intent

statute is to

be given
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v.

plain, obvious,

language

is

clear

and
and

of statutory

389, 3 P.3d at 67.

effect to that intent.

5

If the

its

for the court to resort to legislative history 0r rules

Court must engage in statutory construction,

and give

engaging

Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3

Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219.

unambiguous, there

When

v.

v.

the language 0f a statute

Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State

App. 2000). The language of the

meaning.

interpretation.

Where

effect to the statute as written, Without

Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State

P.3d 65, 67

in

0f Jerome City Code §§ 6.08.020 and 6.08.030 for the

reasons provided at the motion in limine hearing.

renewed

16,

Dog At Large” Was

it

Rhode, 133 Idaho

has the duty t0 ascertain the
at

462, 988 P.2d at 688.

To

ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only

must the

literal

words of the

but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and

Id.

It is

State

v.

incumbent upon a court to give a

statute

(Ct.

1.

On or about

2.

In the State 0f Idaho,

3.

The Defendant was

4.

And permitted the dog to,

5.

Run

at large

Based 0n the

legislative history.

it

a nullity.

App. 2001).

Jury Instruction N0. 18 0f the Final Jury Instructions given at

0f “Vicious dog

its

be examined,

an interpretation that will not render

Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121

that the elements for the crime

statute

trial in this

matter provides

at large” as follows:

[date],

the

owner 0f a Vicious dog,

within the city limits.

citation in this case, as well as statements

made by

the State and magistrate court as

contained in the transcript on appeal, the crime 0f “Vicious dog at large” and the elements listed in
Jury Instruction No. 18 are supposedly located in Jerome City

least,

Code

the magistrate court believes Jerome City

§ 06.08.020, the basic

that the

dog

at large statute.

Jerome City Code unambiguously does

large” 0r an

enhancement

t0 the basic

06.08.020.
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Code

dog

n_ot

§

Code

§ 6.08.030.

Or

at the

very

6.08.030(A) works t0 enhance Jerome City

The Defendant, on

the other hand,

is

adamant

provide for a separate crime 0f “Vicious dog at

at large

misdemeanor found

in

Jerome City Code

§

When

engaging in statutory interpretations, “[p]rovisions should not be read in isolation,

but must be interpreted in the context 0f the entire document.” State
867, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (201 1) (quoting Farber

v.

Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,

Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208

v.

P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (internal citations omitted)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that statutes

Which are

in

pari materia are t0 be construed together t0 further legislative

Canyon Dories

v.

Idaho State Tax

Comm ’n,

124 Idaho

1, 4,

intent.

See Grand

855 P.2d 462, 465 (1993). The Court

has deﬁned in pari materia as follows:

The

be construed together means that each
be interpreted With other acts relating t0 the same matter 0r

rule that statutes in pari materia are t0

legislative act is to

When they relate t0 the same subject. Such
and construed as one system, and the object is t0 carry
into effect the intention. It is t0 be inferred that a code of statutes relating t0 one
subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended t0 be consistent
and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose 0f learning the
intention, all statutes relating t0 the same subj ect are to be compared, and so far as
subject. Statutes are in part" materia
statutes are taken together

in force brought into

still

Id.

(quoting Meyers

City

Code

§

v.

harmony by

interpretation.

City ofldaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89—90, 11 P.2d 626, 629 (1932)). Jerome

6.08.030(A)

states:

“Any Vicious dog

shall, if

found running

for a period not t0 exceed fourteen (14) days, the exact length

by

Any

the chief 0f police.

impounded,
that

such dog, found

at large,

may be killed by any police ofﬁcer 0r animal

may seem

like

it

creates a crime 0f “Vicious

context With the rest 0f Jerome City
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dog

at large,

0f which time

Which cannot be

shall

be impounded
be determined

safely taken

up or

control ofﬁcer 0f the city.” In isolation,

at large”,

Code Chapter 6.08 (Dogs),

but

it is

when

§ 6.08.030 is read in

obvious that the only crime

created

by

that subsection is “Failure t0

comply with a lawful written order of the animal control

ofﬁcer” as provided by Jerome City Code § 6.08.030(E).
It is

one another

necessary t0 examine the language 0f §§ 6.08.010, .020, and .030 in conjunction With
in order t0 understand

what provisions create criminal offenses and which provisions

provide animal control ofﬁcers With administrative powers.
creates the crime 0f

“dog

at large”

by providing,

“It shall

any dog, whether 0r not the same has been licensed,
within the city.” Jerome City

Jerome City Code

§

ofﬁcials can d0 once a

(“VICIOUS DOG:
threat, 0r a

Code

Jerome City Code

§

6.08.020(A)

be unlawful for any owner 0r keeper of

t0 permit such dog, at

§ 6.08.020(B) provides that

“dog

any time,

at large” is

to run at large

a misdemeanor.

6.08.030 contains multiple subsections addressing What animal control

dog has become a “Vicious dog” as deﬁned

A dog

that has bitten,

in

Jerome City Code

§ 6.08.010

clawed 0r otherwise harmed, or constitutes a physical

dog whose temperament or habits endanger 0r menace any person 0r other animal

without provocation by such person 0r animal.”). Although the majority 0f § 6.08.030 provides
administrative authority and remedies to city ofﬁcials dealing with Vicious dogs, as well as

providing for the process that those ofﬁcials must follow, subsection (E) does create a

misdemeanor:

“Failure t0

new

comply With a lawful written order 0f the animal control ofﬁcer 0r

designee of the chief of police under this section shall be a misdemeanor, and shall constitute a
separate offense from any other Violation under this chapter.”

allows the City t0 charge a
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person—Who has been put 0n

The language

notice that their

dog

in subsection (E)

is

Vicious and

Who

has been ordered in writing to keep

it

conﬁned or securely leashed pursuant subsection (D)—with

a misdemeanor under § 6.08.030 and also § 6.08.020 if it gets out and roams at large.
In light 0f the fact that (1) Jerome City
signal that

“dog

at large” is a crime, (2)

Code

§

6.08.020(A) uses the word “unlawful” t0

Jerome City Code

large” a misdemeanor, and (3) § 6.08.030(E) explicitly

§ 6.08.020(B) explicitly

makes “Failure

written order 0f the animal control ofﬁcer” a misdemeanor,
sections 0f the

how t0

Jerome City Code knew

Jerome City Code

offense.

Nothing

crime of

misdemeanoﬂ Accordingly,

1

in

Counsel recognizes that

clear that the drafters 0f these

indicate if a speciﬁc act constituted a

the Court should hold that

at

comply with a lawful

misdemeanor

§ 6.08.030(A), (B), (C), (D), 0r (F), explicitly creates a

§ 6.08.030(B) reads:

cited with the offense of

it is

to

makes “dog

Jerome City Code

new

§ 6.08.030

“In any case where a person has been charged 0r

owning or having custody 0f a Vicious 0r dangerous dog 0r other

animal pursuant t0 the provisions of this chapter, the

city attorney

may ﬁle a motion requesting

destruction of the animal prior to a ﬁnal adjudication 0f the criminal charges.” (Emphasis added).

But

that subsection does not

dangerous dog”, nor does

it

deﬁne the “offense” 0f “owning 0r having custody 0f a Vicious 0r
direct the reader t0 the appropriate subsection.

custody 0f a Vicious 0r dangerous dog” suggests that notice that the dog

is

Moreover, “having
dangerous has been

provided pursuant t0 § 6.08.030(D). Finally, “having custody 0f a Vicious dog”
“Vicious dog at large.”
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is

not the same as

does not create a misdemeanor crime

titled

“Vicious dog at large” or a crime containing the

elements contained in the elements instruction in this case.

However,

honorable Court determines that the language 0f the statute does not

if this

unambiguously support the Defendant’s interpretation 0f the
Court should resolve the case based 0n the rule 0f
969, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct. App. 2014).
applies and the statute

must be construed

this,

See State

lenity.

in favor

The

but rather

v.

0f lenity

is

a Whole
“fairly

Morrison, 143 Idaho

especially appropriate in cases

all that

plain.” [Tr., p.19, L. 1 5-18.]

“[The] courts are Without power to supply what the legislature has

P.3d

v.

where, even the magistrate court admitted that the statute did not “read particularly

ﬂuidly” and that the “plain reading 0f the statute” was “not

3 13

ambiguous, the

Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,

0f the accused. State

rule

is

ambiguous, the rule 0f lenity

If a criminal statute is

459, 461, 147 P.3d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 2006).

such as

statute,

at 769.

left

vague.”

Id. at

441,

That means that the magistrate court most deﬁnitely lacked the authority to create

new crime. Because

“Vicious dog at large”

and accurately reﬂect applicable law.

,9

is

not a crime, the elements instruction did not

Accordingly, the judgment 0f conviction in this

matter should be vacated.

B.

The Magistrate Court Erred When

It

Denied the Defendant’s Motions for Judgment

0f Acquittal Pursuant t0 I.C.R. 29(a) and I.C.R. 29(c)(2).
After the State had rested, the Defendant

Rule 29(a) based on the

moved

for a

fact the State failed t0 introduce

judgment 0f

acquittal pursuant t0

evidence that the dog in question was

over six months 0f age, meaning that the State failed to prove that the animal in question was a
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“dog” for purposes 0f Chapter 06.08.

[Tr., p.75.]

damage

jury could believe that [based 0n] the

that

The magistrate court found
was inﬂicted by

this particular

testimony that was presented by the ofﬁcers as to the behavior, that this dog

”

[Tr, p.77, L.

1

-5.]

Defendant renewed this Rule 29 motion

again after the jury returned

its

verdict.

that “a reasonable

after the

is

animal and the

over the

Defendant rested and

The magistrate court denied those motions

for the

same

reason as before.

The

third element in Jury Instruction

Vicious dog.”

dog

And “Vicious dog”

that has bitten

.

.

.

a term that

is

.”

any person

.

.

by admissible evidence,

and also over
There
in dispute.

six

is

months of age

is

deﬁned by Jerome City Code

And “dog”

the animal species Canis familiaris six (6)

establish,

N0. 18 was, “The Defendant was the owner 0f a

is

deﬁned by

months of age or

that the animal in question

at the

§

06.08.010

older.”

The

§

as,

06.08.010

as,

“Any member 0f

State, therefore,

was a member of “Canis

had

L.16.]

t0

familiaris”

time 0f the incident.

testimony that the animal was a pit bull, so the “Canis familiaris” element

[Tr., p.47,

“A

However, the

State did not present

any evidence

is

not

that could

deﬁnitively establish the age 0f the dog 0n the day in question. If Mr. Quintana had lived next to
the

dog

for

more than

six

months, the State could have presented that as evidence that the dog was

over six months of age.
incident in this case, a

But Mr. Quintana testiﬁed

new

neighbor.

photographs 0f the dog, showing that

it

[Tr., p.46,

was an

the State could have asked the Defendant,
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that the

L.16-17.]

adult pit bull.

who took the

Defendant was,

The

at the

State could

have introduced

But the State elected not

stand in her

time of the

t0.

Finally,

own defense, how old the dog

in

question—Rhino—was. Defense counsel asked
“I got

and the Defendant candidly responded,
[Tr., p.85,

The magistrate court

[Tr.,

it’s

rested

& p.72, L.21.]

But dogs

its

knowledge—in this

case,

wounds reﬂected

(quoting

C0.,

to

Oana

v.

v.

.

ofwhich were related t0 Rhino’s

in State’s Exhibits

it is

1

through

4.

was
[Tr.,

impermissible for jurors t0 use specialized

knowledge of pit bull jaw development and bite wound sizes—
This

is

because a

“trier

of fact

deliberations matters 0f common experience,” not specialize personal

Fouche

.

ﬁve months and three weeks 01d can be aggressive and

Moreover,

assuming they have such knowledge.

“the rest 0f mankind.”

.”
.

decision 0n the ofﬁcers’ testimony that the dog

that are

Vicious, as well as fairly powerful.

been 12 years, 13 year

p.89-90.]

aggressive and Vicious, as well as the bite

personal

Karma about —

L.24-25.] But the State only asked six questions, none

age on the day 0f the incident.

p.66, L.3

the Defendant about the age of a different dog,

is

permitted t0 use in his

knowledge not possessed by

Chrysler Motors Corp, 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984)

Haskell, 441 P.2d 259, 263 (Ariz. App. 1968) and

483 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Kan. 1971)).

An expert on pit bulls

Noland v.

or animal bite

Sears,

Roebuck

&

wounds would need

be called in order to match speciﬁc bite wound sizes to the corresponding age ofthe dog. Indeed,

it is

the function of the expert t0 provide testimony

0n

experience and education 0f the average juror. State

33 (1988) (quoting State

v.

is

sense,

Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 694, 760 P.2d 27,

not whether this Court would

beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether

-

v.

beyond the common

Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. 1986)).

“The relevant inquiry
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‘after

ﬁnd

the defendant t0 be guilty

Viewing the evidence in the

light

most favorable

t0

the prosecution, any rational trier 0f fact could have found the essential elements 0f the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt’.”
(quoting Jackson

v.

Virginia,

State

v.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012)

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The

State, in this case, failed t0 introduce

any evidence deﬁnitively establishing the age 0f the dog, despite having every opportunity

The magistrate court saved

so.

dog based on the

by allowing

0f the bite wounds and the aggressiveness of the dog? However, no rational

opposed

(as

wounds) could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that the

months of age, rather than just ﬁve months and three weeks
C. There

d0

the jury t0 erroneously infer the age 0f the

0f fact possessing generalized knowledge 0f dogs

trier

bite

size

the State

t0

Was Insufﬁcient Evidence t0

to specialized

dog

in question

knowledge 0f

was

at least six

01d.

Sustain a Verdict 0f Guilty.

For the same reasons that the magistrate court erred in denying the Defendant’s Rule 29
motions, this Court should hold that there was insufﬁcient evidence on which the jury could base
a verdict of guilty.

2

One reason

bull”

is

against allowing an inference into age based

a generic term for

many breeds, some 0f Which
Just as an example, a

never reach that weight.

puppy can weigh more than a

full

grown

0n weight and

are forty

bite

wounds

is

that “pit

pounds as puppies, While others

ﬁve-month old American Staffordshire Terrier

Staffordshire Bull Terrier.

AMERICAN STAFFORDSHIRE

TERRIER, https://WWW.akc.org/dog-breeds/american-staffordshire-terrier/, with Staffordshire Bull
Terrier,

AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB,
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https://www.akc.org/dog-breeds/staffordshire-bu11-terrier/.

CONCLUSION

V.
In this case, the Defendant

was convicted 0f a crime

Jerome City Code, which caused her motion

that is not located

in limine to fail,

exposed her

anywhere

in the

t0 a large restitution

become

res

judicata. Moreover, the State failed to prove one of the most basic elements 0f the crime she

was

award, and

may have

caused an important element of a potential

civil lawsuit to

charged with, meaning the Defendant’s motion for judgment 0f acquittal should have been granted.
Accordingly, the Defendant

DATED this

is

asking that this Court vacate her judgment 0f conviction.

1“ day 0f April, 2020.

By

Adam J. Ondo
Adam J. Ondo [ISB No.

/s/

10389]
Attorney for Defendant—Appellant

Jerome County Public Defender
121 3rd

Ave

East,

Jerome, Idaho 83338

aondo@magicvalleylegal.com
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